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This paper presents a dynamic model of a public pension fund’s choice of portfolio risk.  Optimal
portfolio allocations are derived when pension fund management maximize the utility of wealth ofD
representative taxpayer or when pension fund management maximize their own utility of compensation.7KH
model’s implications are examined using annual data on the portfolio allocations and plan characteristics
of 125 state pension funds over the 2000 to 2009 period.  Consistent with agency behavior by public
pension fund management, we find evidence that funds chose greater overall asset – liability portfolio
risk following periods of relatively poor investment performance.  In addition, pension plans that select
a relatively high rate with which to discount their liabilities tend to choose riskier portfolios.  Moreover,
consistent with a desire to gamble for higher benefits, pension plans take more risk when they have
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This paper examines the portfolio allocation policies of U.S. state and local 
government pension funds.  It presents a dynamic model of public pension fund 
investment choice and analyzes how risk-taking behavior may vary with the pension 
plan’s characteristics.  Risk is measured by the volatility of a fund’s asset portfolio rate of 
return relative to the rate of return on the market value of its liabilities.  The model’s 
implications are examined using annual data on 125 state pension funds over the period 
from 2000 to 2009. 
The asset allocation choice of a public pension fund is critical to understanding 
the problem of public pension plan under-funding.  A public pension fund’s annual 
investment return is typically much larger in magnitude than its annual employer and 
employee contributions (Munnell and Soto (2007)).  Furthermore, the fund’s portfolio 
allocation across broad asset classes is the major determinant of its investment return 
(Brinson, Hood, and Beebower (1986) and Brinson, Singer, and Beebower (1991)).  
Thus, a pension fund’s portfolio allocation policy has first-order consequences for its 
funding status.  
Public pension fund asset allocation also is of interest because, in aggregate, it has 
changed drastically over time.  Based on Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data, Figure 1 
shows that state and local government pension funds invested almost entirely in cash and 
fixed income instruments during the 1950s, but gradually increased their portfolio 
allocations in equities and, more recently, in other investments (including real estate,   2
private equity, and hedge fund investments).
1  This trend slowed over the last decade, a 
period when public pension portfolio allocations to equities, fixed income, other 
investments, and cash have averaged 59%, 30%, 9%, and 2%, respectively. 
A benchmark policy for assessing a pension fund’s investment choice is a 
portfolio allocation that best hedges or “immunizes” the risk of its liabilities.  The value 
of a pension fund’s liabilities equals the value of the retirement annuities that it is 
obligated to pay its employees and retirees.  These retirement annuities typically are 
linked to a worker’s wages and years of service, and most often payments are partially 
indexed to inflation.  Hence, the value of pension liabilities is exposed to risks from real 
or nominal interest rate changes and also changes in wage rates.  Therefore, a satisfactory 
analysis of portfolio choice with a goal of liability immunization should account for 
uncertainty in both interest rates and wage growth. 
Portfolio allocations that deviate from the benchmark portfolio which best 
immunizes liabilities introduce what we refer to as “tracking error.”  This paper considers 
how different pension fund objectives influence the choice of tracking error volatility and 
how this volatility might be influenced by the pension plan’s funding ratio, past returns, 
and other plan characteristics.  Our study is perhaps the first to examine the overall asset 
- liability risks of a time series – cross section sample of public pension funds.  We use 
data on state and local government wages and various investment classes to compute a 
single measure of tracking error volatility for each pension fund during each year.  We 
estimate the risks of wage changes and changes in the returns on long-term real and 
nominal liability payments as well as the risks of returns on seven different investment 
                                                           
1 Munnell and Soto (2007) also document this trend in public pension allocation.  Similar behavior has   3
categories: U.S. equities, foreign equities, U.S. fixed income, foreign fixed income, real 
estate, private equity, and hedge funds.  By using the covariance matrix of these assets’ 
returns and an individual pension fund’s portfolio allocation and liability structure, we 
calculate each fund’s overall tracking error volatility and then relate this measure to the 
fund’s characteristics. 
The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section II briefly discusses related theoretical 
and empirical work on the portfolio allocations of state and local pension funds.  Our 
model is presented in Section III.  Section IV describes our data and variable 
construction, while Section V presents the empirical results.  Concluding comments are 
in Section VI. 
II. Related Literature on Public Pension Fund Portfolio Allocation 
The focus of this paper is a public pension fund’s portfolio allocation relative to a 
benchmark portfolio that best hedges (immunizes) the fund’s liability risks.  To evaluate 
liability risk, one must first determine a method for valuing pension liabilities since they 
are not marketable securities.  There is disagreement on how this should be done, with 
the major conflict between the actuarial approach specified by the Government 
Accounting Standards Board (GASB) and the market value approach based on finance 
theory.
2  The GASB actuarial approach discounts a pension plan’s future retirement 
payments using the expected rate of return on the pension plan’s assets, rather than a 
discount rate appropriate to the actual risk of the pension plan’s retirement payments. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
occurred with corporate defined-benefit pension plans.  See, for example, in Ruthen (2005). 
2 GASB is a private organization established in the early 1980s.  While not obligated to do so, in practice 
state and local pension plans report the value of their pension liabilities using GASB standards.  GASB 
also sets standards for contributions that public pension funds should make to prevent significant 
underfunding. Munnell, Haverstick, Sass, and Aubrey (2008) credit the creation of GASB with improved 
funding by public pension plans.   4
As pointed out in many papers, most recently by Brown and Wilcox (2009), 
Lucas and Zeldes (2009), and Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009), valuation using the GASB 
actuarial standard is inconsistent with basic financial theory.  Moreover, its use creates 
moral hazard incentives in the form of “accounting arbitrage”: a pension plan has the 
incentive to invest in assets with high systematic risk in order to justify a higher discount 
rate that will reduce the actuarial valuation of its liabilities.  The GASB standard also can 
lead to accounting games that reach beyond the public pension fund by reducing the 
accounting value of a municipality’s overall budget deficit via the issuance of pension 
obligation bonds.
3 
A financial valuation approach eliminates these arbitrage opportunities and moral 
hazard incentives.  We take it as a settled question that a financial theory-based market 
valuation approach more accurately reflects the risk of pension liabilities.  A more subtle 
issue is whether the most relevant market value measure should be the pension fund’s 
Accumulated Benefit Obligation (ABO) or Projected Benefit Obligation (PBO).  
Typically, the annual annuity payment paid by a public pension plan to a participant is 
the product of the participant’s final average salary over the last one to five years, years 
of credited service, and a benefit multiplier often from 1% to 2.5%.  The ABO is the 
present value of these payments based on current years of service and the current average 
salary, whereas the PBO is the present value based on current years of service and an 
estimated future average salary just prior to retirement. 
Arguments for using ABO include Bulow (1982), Bodie (1990), Gold and 
Hudson (2003), and Brown and Wilcox (2009).  In contrast, Lucas and Zeldes (2006), 
                                                           
3 Munnell, Calabrese, Monk, and Aubry (2010) show that issuance of pension obligation bonds became a   5
Peng (2009), and Munnell, Kopcke, Aubry, and Quinby (2010) support the use of PBO.  
ABO may better reflect the pension fund’s current legal obligation to pay benefits.  
However, for hedging liability risk when the public pension plan is likely to be a 
continuing concern, the PBO better incorporates future risks.  Therefore, we employ it to 
value our benchmark immunizing portfolio.
4  The effect of using PBO is to include 
future wage uncertainty as a component of overall liability risk. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Black (1989) recommends that if a pension fund manager takes a narrow view by 
hedging the ABO measure of pension liabilities, the pension portfolio should invest 
almost exclusively in duration-matching bonds.  If a broader PBO view is taken, then he 
recommends some allocation to stocks under the assumptions that stock returns are 
positively correlated with wage growth.  Peskin (2001) supports this view and finds that a 
20% to 90% allocation to equities could be optimal depending on the characteristics of a 
particular public pension fund. 
Lucas and Zeldes (2009) come to a similar conclusion from a model where a 
municipality wishes to minimize tax distortions and pension liabilities are positively 
correlated with stocks.  Their model predicts that pension funds should invest more in 
stocks if their liabilities are more wage-sensitive, which should be the case if a pension 
fund has a relatively high ratio of currently-employed pension participants to pension 
plan retirees.  However, they find no empirical evidence for this prediction based on year 
2006 Boston College Center for Retirement Research (CRR) data on equity allocations 
 
losing investment strategy as a result of the recent financial crisis. 
4 Bodie (1990) argues that a corporate pension fund’s relevant obligation to be hedged is its ABO because 
its PBO is not guaranteed by the corporation or by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) 
should the corporation fail.  This reasoning is less relevant for public pension plans. Peng (2009) argues 
that public plan benefits are relatively more secure because, unlike corporate plans, municipalities typically   6
for state and local pension funds.  They did find that pension plans with higher funding 
ratios allocated more to stocks. 
III. A Public Pension Fund Model 
  A public pension fund’s portfolio choice will derive from its objective function.  
Therefore, we begin by considering both normative and positive objectives of a public 
pension fund’s investment management. 
III.A The Public Pension Fund’s Investment Objective 
As will be discussed, academics and practitioners often disagree on the proper 
objective of a public pension plan.  The divergence of views partly may arise due to the 
difficulty of envisioning an objective for a public pension fund that is separate from the 
overall objective of its municipal government.  As one component of the government, a 
public pension fund’s portfolio choices could be made in conjunction with the 
municipality’s other asset and liability decisions.  For example, pension portfolio 
decisions might account for a desire to hedge liability risks that include municipal bonds 
and other benefit obligations, in addition to pension liabilities. 
Taking an even broader Ricardian (1820) / Modigliani-Miller (1958) perspective 
would imply that even the municipal government’s overall objective is not relevant when 
it is but one component of individuals’ overall portfolio decisions.  As discussed in Bader 
and Gold (2007), arguments along the lines of Barro (1974) imply that any balance sheet 
(including pension fund) decision made by a municipal government would be offset by 
the savings and portfolio decisions of rational private agents.  If private individuals and 
firms recognize the future tax consequences of a government’s (dis-) savings and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
cannot extinguish their obligations to pay pension benefits, even following bankruptcy.  As a consequence,   7
portfolio decisions, those public decisions could be over-turned by private portfolio 
decisions.
5 
However, as summarized in Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999), the conditions that 
enable private individuals to fully neutralize government savings and portfolio decisions 
are unlikely to hold in practice.  Heterogeneity amongst individuals, borrowing 
constraints, tax distortions, and imperfect information regarding government policies 
implies that public pension policies very likely effect the net tax burdens by individuals 
and, therefore, have real welfare consequences. 
Due to such frictions, Peskin (2001) argues that the risk that pension fund returns 
fail to match pension fund liabilities imposes intergenerational transfers because future 
generations are not compensated for the taxes they pay to cover current pension 
obligations resulting from pension underfunding.  Intergenerational equity is likely to be 
improved if unfunded pension costs are not borne by later generations of taxpayers.  
Moreover, relative to the federal government, state and local governments have more 
limited means with which to cope with underfunding: they cannot inflate-away the value 
of their liabilities via money creation.  Thus, unlike the federal social security program 
that operates on a pay-as-you-do basis, state and local governments may want to maintain 
a funded pension plan in order to minimize the possibility of unsustainable fiscal 
imbalances.  Peng (2009) believes this is the reason why almost all state and local 
pension plans are pre-funded. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
a public-sector worker who continues to be employed is likely to receive her PBO at retirement.   
5 For example, McDonald (1983) argues for a Miller Theorem result where a reduction in equity issuance 
by private corporations offsets increased municipal bond issuance.  Lucas and Zeldes (2009) discuss how a 
Modigliani-Miller (1958) Theorem can hold where private portfolio decisions undo public ones.   8
  Even if pension fund deficits are covered by an immediate rise in taxes paid by 
the current generation of taxpayers, risk-aversion and intra-generational equity can be an 
additional rationale for hedging.  Not only might a pension fund’s objective be to fund 
the present value of pension obligations as they accrue, but also to reduce the uncertainty 
that investment returns fail to match the change in the present value of obligations due to 
changing market conditions.  A fully-funded pension plan whose investments best hedge 
the change in value of its liabilities fits this ideal of minimizing the uncertainty of taxes 
needed to fund pension obligations.
6 
We find this argument compelling, with one caveat.  It is unlikely that a 
municipal government’s other expenditures for non-pension benefits are fully matched by 
contemporaneous tax revenues at each point in time.  In particular, during economic 
downturns, tax revenues (excluding pension contributions) typically fail to cover non-
pension expenditures.  If one wished to hedge the net tax surplus of the municipality’s 
aggregate balance sheet, pension investments might be chosen so that their returns 
outperform those of pension liabilities during economic recessions and underperform 
them during economic expansions.
7 
Thus, from a normative view based on minimizing inter- and intra-generational 
inequities, a strong argument may be made that pension liabilities should be funded as 
they accrue and investment policy should be that which best hedges liabilities and, 
possibly, the municipality’s other budget deficits. 
In practice, state and local governments typically do not incorporate pension fund 
investment decisions within a single, framework for managing their overall balance 
                                                           
6 The Lucas and Zeldes (2009) model with costly tax distortions provides these insights.   9
sheets.  Rather, governments delegate the administration of a public pension plan to a 
Board of Trustees who may be appointed or may be elected by plan participants.  The 
Board’s scope of responsibility tends to focus narrowly on the pension plan, without 
regard to other municipal assets and liabilities.  Most commonly the Board sets policy 
objectives regarding investment policies and asset allocation that are carried out by a 
supporting staff headed by an executive director.  The Board and staff often further 
delegate investment decisions to professional pension plan consultants and money 
managers. 
The typical procedure is for the Board to establish broad asset allocations in 
various investment classes, such as fixed income, equities, and alternative investments.  
Within these classes, internal staff and/or external money managers are given 
responsibility for choosing particular securities and investments.  Most frequently, a 
money manager’s performance is measured against market benchmarks or peer money 
managers having similar investment styles. 
Evidence suggests that the most important aspect of a pension fund’s overall 
investment performance is its decisions regarding allocations into various asset classes, 
rather than the choice of money managers for each given asset class.  Empirical studies of 
large corporate pension funds by Brinson, Hood, and Beebower (1986) and Brinson, 
Singer, and Beebower (1991) find that over 90% of investment returns are explained by a 
fund’s asset allocation policy.  Hence, it would appear that the pension Board’s asset 
class allocation decisions are critical. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
7 One indication of such a situation is when a municipal government finds it difficult to make pension 
contributions to cover accrued liabilities during poor economic conditions.   10
Presumably, the objectives set by a public pension fund’s Board would determine 
the chosen asset-class allocations.  Peng (2009) notes that typically these objectives state 
numerical goals for ex-post investment returns, rather than a desire to hedge the risk of 
liabilities.  Moreover, asset-class portfolio weights often are chosen based on mean-
variance portfolio efficiency with little regard to the risk characteristics of pension 
liabilities.  As a consequence, a pension fund’s chosen investments may leave it exposed 
to significant risk from changes in the market value of its liabilities.
8 
Why might the investment objectives of many public pension funds have minimal 
connection to the risk characteristics of their liabilities?  A potential explanation for this 
behavior is that archaic GASB pension fund accounting clouds the true market valuation 
of pension liabilities.  Lacking a market value measure of liabilities to benchmark the 
market value of pension assets may discourage the hedging of pension liability risk.  
Moreover, opaque accounting of pension liabilities may affect how the pension fund’s 
performance is measured. Rather than, or in addition to, being judged on how the pension 
fund’s investments hedge the market risk of its liabilities, the pension Board and staff’s 
performance may be gauged against the investment performance of similar public 
pension funds.  Peskin (2001) describes such a peer group benchmark as belonging to the 
“traditional” approach to public pension investment management.  Park (2009) argues 
that such a peer group benchmark is a result of career concerns by the public pension 
plan’s Board of Trustees and staff and is reinforced by “prudent person” fiduciary 
standards. 
III.B Public Pension Fund Portfolio Choice 
                                                           
8 For example, Ruthen (2005) and Adams and Smith (2009) point out that the typical pension fund’s large   11
Given the previous discussion, we begin with a model that assumes a non-
Ricardian environment where a pension fund’s objective recognizes that its future 
funding status has tax consequences for a representative resident of the municipality.  
Since a pension plan’s Board of Trustees tend to have a narrow scope of responsibility, 
we also assume that the pension fund’s objective is separable from the other assets and 
liabilities composing the municipality’s overall balance sheet.  Because future funding 
status depends on the risk of pension liabilities, in addition to pension investments, our 
analysis first recognizes the role of liability risk and considers a liability immunizing 
portfolio as the benchmark investment strategy.  We will later consider the consequences 
of an investment objective that is divorced from liability risk and where the pension 
fund’s benchmark becomes the average performance of its peers. 
The model is similar to Chen and Pennacchi (2009), and details regarding its 
derivation can be found in that paper.  Let the initial date be 0 and let the end of the 
pension fund’s performance horizon be date T.  The interval from date 0 to T might be 
interpreted as the municipality’s fiscal year or a longer period over which pension over- 
or under-funding has tax consequences and thereby affects the wealth of the 
municipality’s residents.  Since our focus is on portfolio allocation given an initial level 
of funding, we assume that contributions by the pension fund’s government employer and 
its employees are made just prior to date 0, as are any cash outflows to pay retirement 
benefits.  Thus from date 0 to date T, the only changes in the values of pension assets and 
liabilities are assumed to derive from their market rates of return. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
allocation to equities while its liabilities are fixed income in nature exposes it to increased underfunding 
when interest rates unexpectedly decline.   12
During the interval from dates 0 to T, the pension fund’s benchmark, which for 







ασ =+                                                        (1) 
where dzL is a Brownian motion process.  The Appendix shows how a rate of return 
process of this form can be derived from the value of individual employees’ projected 
benefits and retirees’ annuities.  In particular, the process depends on risks from changes 
in wages and changes in the value of nominal or, in the case of Cost of Living 
Adjustments (COLAs), inflation-indexed (real) bonds. 
The pension fund can choose investments that are assumed to perfectly match 
(immunize) the above rate of return on liabilities.  It can also choose another portfolio of 
“alternative” securities.  These alternative securities are defined as the portion of the 
fund’s total assets that accounts for the difference between the fund’s portfolio and one 
that is invested solely in the liability immunizing benchmark portfolio. Let At be the date 









                                                          
                                                         (2) 
where dzA is another Brownian motion such that σLdzLσAdzA = σALdt.  For simplicity, σA, 
σL, and σAL are assumed to be constants.  αA and αL may be time varying, as would be the 
case when market interest rates are stochastic, but it is assumed that their spread, αA -αL, 
is constant. 
 
9 Although we only consider the choice of a single alternative securities portfolio, the appendix of Chen 
and Pennacchi (2009) shows that permitting multiple alternative security choices can simply to this single 
alternative portfolio choice problem.   13
  If at date t the pension fund allocates a portfolio proportion of 1-ωt to the 
immunizing portfolio and a proportion ωt to the alternative investments, then the value of 
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Whenever ωt  ≠ 0, the fund’s return in equation (3) deviates from the liability immunizing 
portfolio’s return.  Now define Gt ≡ Vt/Lt to be the pension fund’s date t funding ratio; 
that is, value of the fund’s assets relative to that of its liabilities.  At date 0, G0 =V0 /L0 
and then by Itô’s lemma evolves over the interval from date 0 to date T according to 
() (
2 t





ωα α σ σ ωσ σ =− + − + − )                            (4) 
Given that a public pension fund must pay its promised retirement benefits, future 
over- or under-funding at date T is assumed to be the obligation of the municipality’s 
taxpayers.  Thus, an aggregate change of wealth equal to VT – LT accrues to taxpayers at 
date T.  For analytical convenience, the population of representative taxpaying 
individuals at date T is assumed to be proportional to the value of date T liabilities.
10  
Hence, the representative taxpayer’s date T wealth might be written as 
ˆˆ 1















                                                          
                                        (5) 
where  is assumed to be a constant that includes wealth unrelated to pension 
funding and λ > 0 is the ratio of pension liabilities per representative taxpayer.  The 
ˆ 1 ww ≡−
 
10 This would be approximately the case if there is a steady-state ratio of pension benefits to population, λ.   14
larger is λ, the more sensitive is the taxpayer’s wealth to the pension plan’s funding 
status.  If taxpayers’ utilities display constant relative risk aversion with coefficient (1- γ) 
> 0, and pension investment policy has the objective of maximizing their utility, then the 
pension fund’s asset allocation problem is 
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subject to the pension funding ratio dynamics in equation (4).  The solution for the 





















                                                  (7) 
where   and  .  Equation (7) says that when αG is 
positive (negative), the pension fund takes a long (short) position in the alternative 
securities.
2
GA L L ααασσ ≡−+−
22 2 GA A L σσ σ σ ≡− +
12  This deviating position is tempered by the relative volatility of the 
alternative securities, σG, and also the representative taxpayer’s coefficient of relative 
risk aversion, (1- γ). 
Perhaps the most interesting insight from equation (7) is how allocations away 














                                               (8) 
This derivative is negative whenever w is positive, so that when the representative 
taxpayer’s wealth unrelated to pension funding is sufficiently large, declines in Gt raise 
                                                           
11 See Chen and Pennacchi (2009) for the derivation.   15
*
t ω .  In other words, a fall in the pension plan’s funding ratio leads to a larger deviating 
allocation and greater “tracking error” risk, which might be interpreted as risk-seeking 
behavior.  The reverse holds when w is negative, so that when wealth unrelated to 
pension funding is small, the pension fund decreases its deviating allocation (tracking 
error) with pension underfunding; that is, it better hedges its liabilities as its funding ratio 
declines.  The intuition for this behavior stems from the desire to avoid negative wealth 
when w < 0 makes it a possibility. 
  Based on our earlier discussion, these model results come with several caveats.  
First, the representative taxpayer faces taxation risk not just from the municipality’s 
pension under-funding but from other deficits/surpluses that may arise from the 
government’s other activities.  Recognizing these other sources of tax uncertainty in the 
individual’s wealth in equation (5) could motivate the pension fund to hedge those risks.  
For example, if budget surpluses were procyclical, the pension fund might wish to choose 
counter-cyclical alternative securities that produce high (low) returns relative to the 
benchmark during economic recessions (expansions). 
Second, the model takes the individual’s portion of wealth unrelated to pension 
returns, w, as non-stochastic, as might be the case if the individual invested entirely in a 
default-free bond maturing at date T.  If this other wealth were invested in risky assets, 
then again there would be a hedging motive when the pension fund chose its portfolio 
weight in the alternative securities.  Third, if the representative taxpayer’s choice of 
assets that composed her personal wealth were endogenous, then the pension fund’s 
portfolio choice and the uncertainty of GT could be offset by personal portfolio decisions.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
12 It can be shown that the optimal portfolio behavior ensures that [1 + w/(λGt)] is always positive.   16
Fourth, if personal portfolio decisions were endogenous and the municipality wished to 
maximize the representative taxpayer’s utility of wealth after paying federal income 
taxes, then Bader and Gold (2007) show that the pension fund should be invested in 
bonds, rather than equities.  Because equities are taxed at a lower federal personal tax 
rate relative to bonds, but all pension fund investments are federal tax-exempt, 
individuals would pay lower federal taxes if their exposure to (relatively high-taxed) 
bonds were held by the pension fund and they held equities in their personal portfolio. 
Finally, it may be unrealistic to assume that when the pension fund ends with a 
surplus (GT > 1) that the representative taxpayer’s wealth is incremented by that amount.  
Political pressure leads to a sharing of the surplus with employees in the form of a 
reduction in employee contributions or an increase in pension benefits.
13 
These numerous caveats cast doubt on whether a public pension fund’s 
investment strategy should attempt to provide an optimal tradeoff of expected return for 
risk on behalf of taxpayers as outlined in equation (7).  Rather, these qualifications tend 
to favor an investment policy that passively follows the liability immunizing strategy 
where ωt = 0 ∀ t.  Such a strategy would be transparent to taxpayers, allowing them to 
focus on their individual portfolios.  It also avoids generating surpluses that taxpayers 
would be forced to share with employees.  In addition, since this policy entails primarily 
fixed-income investments, it provides federal tax savings. 
  Shifting from a normative to a positive theory of public pension fund investment 
behavior, we note that the practice of delegating pension fund management could lead to 
agency problems where the Board of Trustees and staff maximize their own utility of 
                                                           
13 This point is made by Peskin (2001), Bader and Gold (2007), Peng (2009), among others.   17
wealth rather than that of a representative taxpayer.  In addition, since stated objectives 
guiding pension plan investments often downplay the risk of pension liabilities, the 
Board and staff may be judged against a broader set of benchmarks that include the 
investment performance of peer pension plans.  In this light, the wealth in equation (5) 
can be re-interpreted as that of the pension Board and staff where the process followed by 
the benchmark Lt in (1) may not necessarily be the rate of return on the pension fund’s 
liabilities but could be a benchmark such as the average rate of return earned by other 
public pension funds.  Thus, if explicit or implicit (career concern) compensation is 
performance-related, the pension Board and staff’s wealth will be linked to future relative 
performance, GT  = VT/LT, measured as the pension plan’s funding ratio or its investment 
performance relative to its peers.  
The solution for optimal portfolio choice continues to satisfy equations (7) and 
(8), so that if the Board and staff’s wealth unrelated their pension performance is 
sufficiently large (w > 0), they will increase the fund’s tracking error risk as their relative 
performance declines.  If their wealth that is unrelated to performance is low (w < 0), the 
pension fund’s management will decrease its tracking error risk as its performance 
declines.   
The next sections of the paper examine the empirical evidence related to our 
model based on a time series and cross section of state pension plans.  We investigate 
how a state pension plan’s choice of tracking error volatility, which from equation (4) is 
given by  tG ωσ, relates to its characteristics, such as the plan’s funding ratio and its 
performance relative to its peers.  We also consider other characteristics related to plan   18
design, governance, and participant demographics that could determine tracking error 
risk. 
IV. Data and Variable Construction 
Our data on state pension funds comes from two sources.  The first source is 
Wilshire Associates who generously provided us with an annual time series of investment 
information on 125 state pension funds over the 2000 to 2009 period.
14  This data 
includes each fund’s actuarial values of liabilities and actuarial and market values of 
assets for each of the ten years.  Also for each year, it gives every fund’s proportion of 
assets allocated to eight different categories: U.S. equities, non-U.S. equities, U.S. fixed 
income, non-U.S. fixed income, real estate, private equity, hedge funds, and other.  Also 
included is each fund’s assumed rate for discounting liabilities and the total payroll for 
active participants in the pension fund. 
  The second source of pension fund information comes from the Boston College 
Center for Retirement Research (CRR).  This is publicly-available data on 112 state 
pension funds for the year 2006.
15  It includes individual pension fund characteristics 
pertaining to governance, the type of plan participants (general employees, teachers, or 
police and firefighters), the design of plan benefits (e.g., the type of COLA), and numbers 
of active members and annuitants. 
Comparing the state pension funds in the Wilshire data to those in the CRR data 
led to 97 matches.  Based on these 97 state plans, we selected from the CRR the 
following variables: the ratio of a pension fund’s Board members who are plan 
participants to the total Board members of the pension fund; a dummy variable equaling 
                                                           
14 Due to late reporting, information on only 50 state funds is available for the year 2009.   19
1 if the pension fund had a separate investment council (zero otherwise); and a dummy 
variable equaling 1 if the contribution rate of the pension fund sponsor was statutorily set 
(zero otherwise).      
  As previously mentioned, our measure of a pension fund’s overall asset - liability 
risk-taking is its tracking error volatility.  To translate a given pension fund’s asset-class 
allocations for a given year into this risk measure, we collected for the period January 
1997 to April 2010 monthly time series of asset returns in order to estimate a covariance 
matrix of returns for seven different asset classes.
16  The following asset return series 
were chosen: U.S. equities – Vanguard Total Stock Market Index Institutional Fund; 
Non-U.S. equities – Vanguard Total International Stock Index Fund; U.S. fixed income – 
Vanguard Total Bond Market Index Institutional Fund; Non-U.S. fixed income – 
Barclays Capital Global Majors, Ex. U.S., Fixed-Income Index; Real estate – Wilshire 
U.S. REIT Index; Hedge funds – Morningstar MSCI Composite Hedge Fund Returns; 
and Private equity – Cambridge Associates U.S. Private Equity Returns.
17  In addition, 
while not an asset class specified in the Wilshire data, a part of our analysis of tracking 
error volatility will use a Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) return series, 
which we proxied by the Vanguard Inflation-Protected Securities Institutional Fund. 
  Time series were also collected on wage growth and returns on nominal and real 
(inflation-indexed) bonds.  This data was used to estimate the variances of market returns 
                                                                                                                                                                             
15 This data is at http://crr.bc.edu/frequently_requested_data/state_and_local_pension_data_4.html.  
16 Recall that the Wilshire data reports eight different asset allocation classes, but one of them is “Other.”  
Because the average “Other” allocation was only 1.9%, we ignored it when computing tracking error 
volatility and proportionally increased the other allocation weights so that they summed to one.  
17 Each of these asset return series is at a monthly frequency except for the Cambridge Associates U.S. 
Private Equity Returns, which is quarterly.  We used the monthly series to estimate the covariance matrix 
of returns, except for those matrix elements relating to the private equity returns, which were estimated 
based on a quarter time series of returns.   20
on pension fund liabilities as well as these returns’ covariances with the different asset 
classes.  For wages, we used the Bureau of Labor Statistics quarterly Employment Cost 
Index for State and Local Government Workers.  For bonds, a monthly time series of 15-
year maturity, zero-coupon bond returns were constructed for nominal Treasuries and 
Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) using the data of Gürkaynak, Sack, and 
Wright (2007, 2008).
18  We choose return series for nominal and real bonds having a 
maturity of 15 years because several sources indicate that the typical pension fund’s 
liabilities have a duration of that length.
19 
In our model, tracking error volatility was represented by the quantity  tG ωσ, 
which is mathematically equivalent to the square root of the variance of the difference in 
the rates of return on pension assets (Vt) and pension liabilities (Lt): 
22 2 VL V L V σσ L ρ σσ +−
2
V σω ω ′ =Ω
.
20  
We estimated the variance of a pension fund’s assets in a given year as , where 
Ω is the estimated covariance matrix of returns for the seven asset classes and ω is the 
7×1 vector of the fund’s portfolio weights (allocations) in these seven asset classes. 
As shown in the Appendix, pension liabilities under a PBO measure are 
composed of wage and bond risk, where the bond risk is either nominal or real (in the 
case of COLA benefits).  Thus, the standard deviation of pension liabilities σL can be 
computed from the estimated standard deviations of wage growth (σLw ) and nominal or 
real bond returns σLp as well as their correlation ρwp: 
22 2 2 L Lw Lp wp Lw Lp σ σσ ρ σσ =++ .  We 
                                                           
18 This Treasury and TIPS yield data is at http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/researchdata.htm.  
We converted the monthly real returns on a 15-year TIPS to nominal ones using the Consumer Price Index. 
19 Ryan and Fabozzi (2002) state “an average 15.5 duration should be close to the median or average 
duration of the pension industry.”  Also, consulting firm Mercer LLC (2010) uses a 15-year duration for 
the average pension plan and states that a pension plan with a typical mix of active members and retirees 
has a duration between 13 and 16 years.    21
calculated this pension liability standard deviation, σL, for four different assumptions: 1) 
nominal liabilities; 2) real (COLA) liabilities; 3) nominal liabilities adjusted for the ratio 
of active to total plan participants; 4) real (COLA) liabilities adjusted for the ratio of 
active to total plan participants.  The Appendix details how, in the latter two cases, the 
standard deviations of wage growth and bond risk (duration) were adjusted using the 
fund’s ratio of active (employed) to total plan participants (including retirees).  These 
adjustments permit a fund’s liabilities to have a duration between 6 and 20 years. 
As discussed in the previous section, in practice some pension funds may not 
view their liabilities as a benchmark but may benchmark their performance to that of peer 
public pension funds.  Therefore, we created an additional tracking error volatility 
measure where, instead of the liability volatilities just discussed, we set 
where ωa is a 7×1 vector of portfolio weights (allocations) that are the 
averages across the 125 state funds for a particular year. 
2
L a σω ω ′ =Ω a
The last step in constructing tracking error volatility calculates the covariance 
between a fund’s chosen assets and the selected liability/peer performance for a particular 
year: VL V L ρ σσ
22 2 VL σσ
.  Then the final measure of tracking error volatility is the square root of 
V L V L ρ σσ +− . 
Table 1 gives summary statistics for different asset class rates of return, as well as 
state and local employee wage growth and returns on 15-year zero-coupon nominal and 
real bonds.  It is the annualized standard deviations and correlations from this table, 
which were calculated over the 1997 to 2010 period, that we use to construct tracking 
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error volatilities.  Of particular interest is the estimated correlation of -0.27 between state 
and local wage growth and U.S. equity returns.  Prior research, including Black (1989), 
Cardinale (2003), and Lucas and Zeldes (2006, 2009) advocate pension fund investments 
in equities as a way to hedge wage uncertainty under the presumption that equities and 
wages are positively correlated. 
A potential criticism of our negative wage-equity correlation estimate is that it is 
calculated over a quarterly holding period.  Recommendations for using stocks to hedge 
wage growth assume that their correlation is positive over a longer holding period.  
Models by Lucas and Zeldes (2006), Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2007), 
and Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2010) show that wage growth and stock returns can have 
zero short-run correlation but, due mean reversion, a correlation that becomes approaches 
1 over long horizons.
21 
As a check, we calculated correlations between wages and equity returns over 
longer holding periods.  Because the BLS state and local worker wage index extends 
back to only 1981, correlations between wage growth and equity returns and wage 
growth and bond returns were calculated using the BLS national wage index, which 
extends back to 1952.  The return on equities was taken to be the S&P 500 return and the 
return on bonds was a 10-year and 20-year maturity Treasury bond return obtained from 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
Table 2 presents estimated wage – asset return correlations for holding periods 
from one year to nine years.  Panel A indicates that there is little evidence of a positive 
correlation between wages and stock returns, and the correlation point estimates trend   23
more negative as the holding period increases.  This pattern of correlation is consistent 
with Jermann (1999) who estimates wage – stock correlations over the 1929 – 1996 
period, finding correlation point estimates that are negative at horizons from 7 to 17 years 
before turning positive.  Since a typical pension fund’s duration of liabilities is about 15 
years, it is not clear whether stocks are the best hedge of wage risk if their correlation 
becomes positive only at longer horizons.   
Another asset class, possibly bonds, might better hedge wage risk.
22  Panels B 
and C of Table 2 find a correlation between wage growth and bond returns whose po
estimates becomes more positive as the holding period increases.  Though none of the 
correlation estimates in Table 2 are statistically significant, the overall evidence does not 
justify large equity holdings for hedging wage risk at horizons relevant to a typical 
pension fund. 
int 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Given our estimated asset return and wage growth standard deviations and 
correlations, the final input in constructing tracking error volatilities is each pension 
fund’s asset allocations for each year.  Summary statistics of these allocations and the 
resulting tracking error volatilities are given in Table 3.  Over the 2000-2009 period, 
there was a moderate decline in the allocation to U.S. equities that was offset by a rise in 
Non-U.S. equities and private equity.  The allocation to U.S. fixed-income peaked at 33% 
in 2002 following the decline in technology stocks, but then trended downward to its 
minimum of 25% in 2009. 
 
21 In contrast, Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2008) present theory and empirical evidence for a negative 
correlation between innovations in human capital and financial asset returns that is counter to models such 
as Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2007). 
22 Most models that demonstrate a long-run correlation between stock returns and wages assume that 
interest rates are constant.  Hence, they do not consider the hedging characteristics of bonds.   24
The average tracking error volatilities in Table 3 show the average overall risk 
taken by the pension funds.  The volatilities tend to be slightly lower when adjusted for 
fund-specific demographic differences as measured by the ratio of active (employed) to 
total participants.  It may be unsurprising that when the average of funds’ allocations is 
used as the benchmark, rather than a fund’s liabilities, tracking error volatilities typically 
are the least. 
Table 3 also includes the yearly averages for two variables that our model 
predicts may influence tracking error volatility: the plan’s funding ratio and its 
investment return.  The funding ratio is measured as the market value of assets divided by 
the actuarial value of liabilities.  The plan’s investment return in a given year is estimated 
as the product of its asset-class allocation weights times the returns earned by each of the 
asset classes.
23  As might be expected, the average funding ratio of these 125 state 
pension plans was highest at 109% during 2000 prior to the technology stock decline and 
was at a minimum of 58% during 2009.  The significant underfunding in 2009 followed 
an estimated 30% investment loss in 2008. 
V. Empirical Evidence 
V.A Immunizing Allocations 
As a prelude to examining how state pension funds’ tracking error volatilities 
vary with their plan characteristics, we first ask what would be the asset portfolio 
allocations that minimize the typical fund’s tracking error volatility.
24  This was done 
                                                           
23 While we have no data on each fund’s actual investment return but only the fund’s portfolio allocation 
for different asset classes and the asset classes’ returns, the evidence Brinson, Hood, and Beebower (1986) 
and Brinson, Singer, and Beebower (1991) suggests that our proxy should be a close approximation. 
24 In principle, we could compute “optimal” portfolio allocations according to the model results in equation 
(7).  However, this computation requires each asset class’s expected rate of return, which are inaccurately 
estimated over our short sample period (Merton, 1980), so that the results would be highly speculative at   25
using our estimated covariance matrix for the asset classes’ returns as well as these 
returns’ covariances with wages and the 15-year duration liabilities of a typical pension 
plan.
25  We adjusted this typical pension fund’s liabilities for demographics that assume a 
ratio of active participants to total participants of 66.57%, which was the average for our 
sample of pension plans.  The portfolio allocations that best hedge (immunize) this 
pension fund’s liabilities are given in Table 4. 
Columns 1, 2, and 3 of Table 4 show results when the pension fund’s liabilities 
are assumed to be purely nominal, having no COLAs.  In column 1, the unconstrained 
allocation that minimizes tracking error volatility calls for a 9% short position in U.S. 
equities, a 160% allocation to U.S. fixed income, a 24% allocation to private equity, and 
a 67% short position in hedge funds.  The huge allocation to U.S. fixed income is partly 
explained by our assumption that the pension funds’ fixed-income investments are of 
lower duration (lower interest rate sensitivity) than the 15-year duration of the pension 
funds’ nominal liabilities.
26  Effectively these allocations imply that the pension fund 
should borrow via short positions in other asset categories in order to increase its U.S. 
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best.  For example, Table 1 reports that the mean return on U.S. equities is less than that on U.S. fixed-
income over the sample period, implying a negative equity premium.  While a longer time series for 
equities and fixed income might be used to estimate expected returns, longer series for other asset 
categories are not generally available.  Also, the aforementioned model caveats tend to move the socially 
optimal allocation toward full immunization, so arguably tracking-error minimizing allocations are 
probably close to optimal. 
25 The tracking error minimizing weights are given by  where Ω is the 7×7 covariance 
matrix of asset returns and Ψ is a 7×2 vector of covariances between the asset returns and pension 
liabilities (wage and nominal or real bond), 1 is a 7×1 vector of ones, and  . 
1 * 1 ωλ
− =Ω Ψ− Ω
λ () (
11 1 / 11
−− =Ω Ψ − Ω ′′
26 Table 1 shows that the annualized standard deviation of U.S. Fixed Income returns is 0.0885 while that 
of the 15-year nominal bond is 0.1376, implying that the duration of the pension funds’ U.S. fixed-income 
investments is approximately 15×(0.0885/0.1376)= 9.6 years.  Adams and Smith (2009) believe that the 
typical pension funds’ fixed income investments are of a lower duration than that of their liabilities.   26
fixed income investment, thereby raising its asset interest sensitivity.
27  If, instead, the 
pension fund’s U.S. fixed income portfolio was assumed to take the form of 15-year zero-
coupon bonds, then its tracking error minimizing allocation would be approximately 
100%, rather than 160%, in U.S. fixed income.
28 
Because a short position in hedge fund investments is infeasible and a large 
allocation to private equity may be unrealistic, column 2 of Table 4 shows the volatility 
minimizing allocation if no private equity or hedge fund investments are permitted.  
There the allocation to fixed income becomes 136%, with a 13% short position in U.S. 
equities and a 17% short position in non-U.S. fixed income.  Column 3 reports tracking 
error minimizing allocations when short sales are not permitted.  Interestingly, the 
immunizing allocation is to invest 100% in fixed-income. 
Columns 4 to 8 of Table 4 assume that the pension fund’s liabilities are fully 
inflation-indexed, real liabilities.  Given the widespread presence of COLAs in state and 
local pension benefits, this case may be more realistic relative to that of purely nominal 
liabilities.  Though the Wilshire data do not specifically identify funds’ allocation to 
inflation-indexed bonds (they would likely be included in U.S. fixed income), we 
consider allocations with and without including TIPS.  When TIPS are included, column 
4 shows that the immunizing allocation is 139% in TIPS with a large short position in 
private equity.  If, as in column 5, private equity and hedge fund investments are 
disallowed, the TIPS allocation becomes 101%.  Column 6 reports allocations when TIPS 
                                                           
27 Interestingly, some public pension funds are borrowing (short-term) to fund greater long-term bond 
investments.  However, their motivation for this strategy appears more to increase their expected target rate 
of return rather than better hedge their liabilities.  See “Pensions Look to Leverage Up: State of Wisconsin 
Investment Board Clears Plan to Borrow to Juice Returns,” The Wall Street Journal, January 27, 2010. 
28 This ignores the desire to hedge the wage risk of liabilities.  The allocation might be slightly more than 
100% given the positive correlation between bond returns and wage growth.   27
are excluded.  The allocation to U.S. fixed income becomes 60% and the allocation to 
non-U.S. fixed income is a large 18%.  Moreover, the allocation to hedge funds switches 
signs, to a large 38% allocation financed with a 20% short position in private equity. 
In column 7, the allocation that excludes TIPS and short sales calls for U.S. and 
foreign fixed income allocations of 70% and 21%, respectively, with an 8% allocation to 
hedge funds. The sizable position in foreign fixed income makes sense since it is likely to 
be a good hedge against U.S. inflation, assuming that exchange rates adjust with 
purchasing power parity.  Column 8 permits investments in TIPS but no short positions.  
The result is a simple 86% allocation to TIPS and a 14% allocation to U.S. fixed-income. 
Finally, note from the last row of Table 4, the minimum tracking error volatilities 
for both nominal and real liabilities are much lower than the average tracking error 
volatilities estimated in Table 3 for our sample of state pension funds.  Figure 2 explores 
this point further by plotting the sample distribution of tracking error volatilities.  It 
graphs, for each fund during each year, the volatility of tracking error relative to the 
fund’s demographically-adjusted real liabilities (horizontal axis) versus the fund’s 
volatility of tracking error relative to its peers (vertical axis).  The distribution appears 
skewed, with only a few pension funds (primarily those with very high allocations to U.S. 
fixed-income) choosing allocations that immunize real liabilities.
29  The vast majority of 
pension funds’ allocations result in peer tracking error volatilities below 4%, indicating a 
tendency to herd far away from an immunizing portfolio.   
V.B Tracking Error Volatility and Plan Characteristics     
                                                           
29 A similar pattern of tracking error volatilities occurs if the funds’ liabilities are assumed to be nominal.    28
Let us now investigate the relationship between a fund’s characteristics and its 
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     (9) 
where σTE,i,t is the tracking error volatility of fund i in year t.  Taking the normative view 
that the pension fund should maximize the utility of a representative taxpayer, our model 
predicts that tracking error should be negatively related to the plan’s funding ratio (β1 < 
0) if the taxpayer’s wealth is sufficiently large (w > 0). 
Instead, if the pension fund is managed to maximize the utility of wealth of the 
pension Board and staff, and their benchmark for compensation includes the “traditional” 
one of return performance relative to the fund’s peers, then tracking error volatility 
should vary with the fund’s past investment return.  In particular, if the wealth of the 
pension Board and staff is sufficiently large (w > 0), then tracking error risk should be 
high following a poor relative return.  A poor relative return might also proxy for the 
amount of recent underfunding for which the Board and staff are directly responsible.  
Consequently, these interpretations of the model predict β2 < 0. 
The regression includes additional explanatory variables listed in Table 5.  These 
include governance-related variables as well as other controls related to the type of 
participants and other characteristics such as a proxy for fund size (the natural log of the 
market value of pension assets), the ratio of payroll to pension liabilities, and the rate 
chosen by the fund to discount its liabilities.  We include the fund’s chosen discount rate,   29
not because it is an exogenous variable, but to explore whether tracking error risk is 
associated with a possible motive to underreport liabilities via a higher discount rate. 
Table 6 reports the outcome of regressions in the general form of equation (9).  
Each regression specification controls for time (year) fixed-effects.  In columns 1, 3, 5, 7, 
and 9, the regressions include time-invariant fund characteristics from the CRR dataset, 
so our observations drop to 97 pension plans per year.  In columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 we 
exclude the CRR data but control for fund fixed-effects, in which case the observations 
equal 125 pension plans per year. 
The results in Table 6 do not differ much when the dependent variable, tracking 
error volatility, is based on a nominal or real pension liability benchmark that is or is not 
adjusted for the demographic characteristics of the individual pension plan.  As shown in 
columns 1 to 8, three explanatory variables are always statistically significant: the prior 
year’s investment return relative to peers; the fund’s chosen rate used to discount 
liabilities; and the proportion of members of the Board of Trustees who are participants.  
In addition, the prior year’s funding ratio is significant when the larger 125 plan sample, 
estimated with fund fixed effects, is used.
30 
The negative coefficients on the fund’s prior-year return and its funding ratio can 
be interpreted as risk-taking behavior on the part of the Board and its staff.  If 
compensation depends on the fund’s investment performance relative to its peers, as well 
as possibly its funding ratio, then our model predicts that when Board wealth is 
                                                           
30 In unreported regressions that exclude the discount rate, the results are nearly identical except that the 
lagged funding ratio is significantly negative only for the regression with demographically unadjusted real 
liabilities and fund fixed-effects.  As another check of robustness, we also substituted each fund’s equity 
allocation for tracking error volatility as the dependent variable and obtained qualitatively the same results.   30
sufficiently large (w > 0), the pension fund chooses greater tracking error volatility 
following poor investment performance. 
The positive relationship between a fund’s chosen rate to discount liabilities and 
its tracking error volatility also seems consistent with risk-taking behavior, though the 
direction of causality is unclear.
31  According to GASB standards, funds with higher 
tracking error volatility may be able to justify a higher discount rate because they are 
investing in assets with higher systematic (priced) risks.  Or, it might be the case that a 
fund is motivated to select a higher discount rate in order to understate its liabilities and 
fictitiously increase its net worth in order to justify greater tracking error risk. 
The finding that a fund takes more tracking error risk when it has greater 
participant representation on its Board of Trustees might be explained in a couple of 
ways.  If pension participants are less financially literate than typical Board members, 
they may have less ability to select asset class allocations that provide a good hedge of 
the pension plan’s liabilities.  Alternatively, participants may knowingly wish to take 
more tracking error risk.  If such a gamble results in a significant pension surplus, Peskin 
(2001), Bader and Gold (2007), and Peng (2009) point out that this surplus is typically 
shared with participants in the form of increased benefits or lower employee contribution 
rates.  In contrast, if the gamble ends with a greater deficit, benefits for current 
participants typically cannot be cut and greater contributions by the state’s taxpayers may 
result. 
Columns 9 and 10 report regression results where the benchmark is assumed to be 
the average investment allocation by peer pension plans.  The estimated coefficients tend   31
to be qualitatively different from the previous regressions where a liability benchmark 
was used.  The positive and statistically significant coefficients on the plan’s prior-year 
funding ratio and prior investment return indicate that pension funds deviate more from 
their peers following better performance.  This finding that better-performing pension 
funds increase their tracking error relative to the average allocation of other funds is not 
inconsistent with the previous regression results.  Figure 2 shows that peer and liability 
benchmarks are quite different, so when better-performing funds deviate more from their 
peers they move closer to an immunizing portfolio.  In other words, a poorly-performing 
pension fund reduces the hedging of its liabilities and gambles by choosing a riskier 
portfolio more typical of its peers.    
VII. Conclusion 
This paper presented a model of public pension fund asset allocation that might 
guide how a municipality chooses its pension investments.  Out model suggests that 
hedging risk from changes in the market value of the pension fund’s liabilities would be 
the primary concern in determining asset allocation decisions.  The model also was 
extended to a setting where career concerns dictate the behavior of a pension fund’s 
portfolio managers.  Our empirical results seem consistent with such agency behavior.  
We find that a public pension fund’s Board of Trustees and staff tend to allocate assets 
based on the performance of peer pension funds rather than based on hedging the pension 
plan’s liabilities. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
31 That funds choosing higher discount rates also choose higher tracking error volatility is consistent with 
Park (2009) who finds that public plans selecting higher discount rates are more likely to invest in real 
estate and alternative investments (including private equity and hedge funds).   32
Consistent with this positive, rather than normative, interpretation of the model, 
our empirical analysis of 125 state pension plans over the 2000-2009 period finds that a 
fund tends to take more asset - liability “tracking error” risk following declines in its 
relative performance.  Tracking error volatility also is higher for pension funds that select 
a high rate with which to discount their liabilities and pension funds that have a greater 
proportion of participants on their Boards of Trustees. 
The portfolio choices of public pension plans that deviate substantially from the 
liability immunizing strategies advocated by many academics seem hard to justify on 
public policy grounds.  Opaque and misleading accounting standards that are divorced 
from finance theory may encourage public plans to follow their “traditional” investment 
strategies of choosing investments with little regard to their true liability risks.  The 
pension fund asset-liability mismatches resulting from these strategies pose a potential 
burden to taxpayers that will be realized then economic conditions decline and when 
losses are most difficult to bear.   33
Appendix 
 
This appendix derives the value and risk characteristics of a pension fund’s 
projected benefit obligation (PBO) when an employee’s retirement benefit equals an 
annuity proportional to the employee’s wages over the last N years of work.  Both wage 
rates and interest rates are stochastic.  One source of uncertainty that we neglect is the 




Let the date t wage rate be wt, which is assumed to grow at a rate that is a constant 
δ less than the rate of return on a tradeable security that has the same priced risk as wage 
growth.
33  Then the risk-neutral process followed by the wage rate can be modeled as 
 
() / tt t w dw w r dt dz δσ =− + w                                             (A.1) 
where σw is the standard deviation of wage growth and rt is the instantaneous-maturity 
default-free (riskless) interest rate. 
 
It is assumed that the term structure of default-free interest rates follows the 




tt dr r r dt dz α =− + r r σ                                               (A.2) 
where α measures the strength of mean reversion of rt to its unconditional mean, 
Q r , and 
the volatility σr is a constant.  The risk-neutral unconditional mean 
equals /
Q
r rr θσ α =+ , wherer is the interest rate’s physical unconditional mean and θ  is 
a market price of interest rate risk.  The wage process and interest rate process may be 
correlated, such that dzwdzr = ρdt.  This model of the instantaneous-maturity interest rates 
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lemma to equation (A.3) implies that the risk-neutral bond price process is 
 
 
32 One could introduce a termination date that differs from the date when the annuity begins, since our 
framework already values individual cashflows that occur following retirement.  Demographic data could 
be used to estimate a worker’s probability of termination (or survival) during a maximum working horizon, 
so that valuation would assign a probability of different horizon annuities for each worker.  Valuation 
would be particularly straightforward if termination probabilities were uncorrelated with interest rates and 
wages. 
33 Pennacchi (1999) similarly models wages.  His footnote 18 discusses how to estimate the parameter δ.  If 
wage growth has positive systematic risk, as is probable if it is positively correlated with stock returns, then 
Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2010) correctly point out that expected future wages should be discounted at a 














=+ p                                             (A.4) 
where   and dzp = - dzr.  () () pr B στ σ τ ≡
An employee is assumed to retire at date T and receive an annual annuity payment 








34  To value this annuity, we divide it into N annuities, each starting at 
date T (with the first payment at date T+1) but set to a different year’s prior wage.  The 
value of the annuity linked to the wage wT-n is denoted 
n
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Given that rt satisfies equation (A.2), its discrete-time distribution is normal with mean 
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Therefore the risk-neutral expectation in (A.5) equals 
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34 Typically, annuity payments are computed as the product of years of service, average wages over the last 
N years of service, and a conversion ratio.  To value the plan’s accrued liabilities adjusted for likely wage 
growth, the parameter c would equal the employee’s current years of service times the conversion ratio.   35
Substituting this result into (A.5): 
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                  (A.9) 
Equation (A.9) shows that the present value of the PBO obligation is a function of the 
current wage rate, wt, various times until maturity (T - t + i where i = 0, 1,…,m), and the 
current interest rate, rt, through the expectation 
term [ ]
() () ( 1
Tnt Tnt QQ
tT n t Er r e r e
α −− − −− −
− =+ − )
α .  Recognizing that the risk-neutral expected 
rate of return on the employee’s benefit must equal rt and its risk-neutral and physical 
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The partial derivatives with respect to the interest rate is  
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is a weight for the annuity payment having the horizon of i years linked to the wage wT-n.  
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               (A.14)                    
 
Equation (A.14) shows that the stochastic process for the PBO liability of a given 
worker includes the same stochastic component as wage growth and a weighted average 
of discounted stochastic components of zero-coupon bonds of various maturities.  
 
Equations (A.9) and (A.14) give the value and rate of return process, respectively, 
of the PBO liability for a given worker.  Next, consider the similar quantities for a retired 
pension plan participant.  The retiree’s annuity payment is known (in nominal terms if 
there is no COLA and in real terms if there is a COLA).  Let cr be the retiree’s annual 
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so that  
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where   is the value of annuity payment i relative to the value 
of all remaining annuity payments. 
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To determine the value and the rate of return process for the pension fund’s 
aggregate liabilities, define   to be the date t value of current employee j’s annuity, 
which reflects her particular retirement date, T, and wage level, c.  Then if the pension 
fund has NE eligible employees, the value of liabilities for all current employees is 
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Let  be the value weight of employee j’s annuity to the value of all 
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where dVj,E/Vj,E follows the process in (A.14).  Since  , this implies that total 
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where Ωj,E is the term in square brackets in the last line of equation (A.14) that pertains to 
employee j. 
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where  ,  , and  Ωj,A is the term multiplying dzp in 
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tt LLL =+ t  be the pension fund’s total liabilities.  The previous results 
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Equation (A.23) shows that the pension fund’s liabilities have a standard deviation 
associated with wage risk equal to the volatility of wage growth times the weight of 
employee liabilities to total liabilities.  The standard deviation associated with bond risk 
is a linear combination of different maturity zero coupon bond standard deviations that 
correspond to the times when employees’ and retirees’ benefits are to be paid.  If these 
standard deviations are approximately constant over time, so that the last two terms in 
(A.23) can be written as σLwdzw + σLpdzp ≡ σLdzL then the physical process corresponding 
to the risk-neutral process in (A.23) equals equation (1) in the text where 
22 2 2 L Lw Lp Lw Lp σσ σ ρσσ =+− and  L tL r αθ =+ L σ
A
t
 where θL is the market price of risk associated 
with the Brownian motion dzL. 
 
Our empirical work approximates   by the pension fund’s 
number of active participants to the total number of active participants and annuitants; 
/1/
E




A).  Also, we approximate the bond standard deviation term in 
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and σp(15) is the standard deviation of a nominal or real zero-coupon Treasury bond 
having a maturity of 15 years.  Note that when N
E/(N
E + N
A) = 0, ϕ  = 0.4 and the pension 
fund’s bond standard deviation is approximately equal that of a bond with maturity 6 




A) = 1, ϕ  = 1.33 and the pension fund’s bond standard deviation is 
approximately equal that of a bond with maturity 20 years, which Mercer (2010) states is 




0.6657, which is the average for our sample of public pension funds, ϕ  = 1 and the 
pension fund’s bond standard deviation is approximately equal that of a bond with 
maturity 15 years, which Mercer (2010) states is the duration of a “typical” pension fund.  
 




Adams, J. and D. Smith (2009) Mind the Gap: Using Derivatives Overlays to Hedge Pension 
Duration, Financial Analysts Journal 65(4) July/August: 60-67. 
 
Bader, L. and J. Gold (2007) The Case against Stock in Public Pension Funds, Financial 
Analysts Journal 63(1) January/February: 55-62. 
 
Barro, R. (1974) Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?, Journal of Political Economy 82: 
1095-1117. 
 
Benzoni, L., P. Collin-Dufresne, and R. Goldstein (2007) Portfolio Choice over the Life-
Cycle when the Stock and Labor Markets are Cointegrated, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago Working Paper 2007-11. 
 
Black, F. (1989) Should You Use Stocks to Hedge Your Pension Liability?, Financial 
Analysts Journal January/February: 10-12. 
 
Bodie, Z. (1990) The ABO, the PBO and Pension Investment Policy, Financial Analysts 
Journal (September-October): 27-34. 
 
Brinson, G., L.R. Hood, and G. Beebower (1986) Determinants of Portfolio Performance, 
Financial Analysts Journal 42(4): 39–44. 
 
Brinson, G., B. Singer, and G. Beebower (1991) Determinants of Portfolio Performance 
II: An Update, Financial Analysts Journal 47(3): 40–48. 
 
Brown, J. and D. Wilcox (2009) Discounting State and Local Pension Liabilities, American 
Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 99(2): 538-542. 
 
Bulow, J. (1982) What Are Corporate Pension Liabilities?, Quarterly Journal of Economics 
97: 435-452.  
 
Cardinale, M. (2003) Cointegration and the Relationship Between Pension Liabilities and 
Asset Prices, Watson Wyatt Technical Paper Series. 
 
Chen, H. and G. Pennacchi (2009) Does Prior Performance Affect a Mutual Fund’s Choice 
of Risk? Theory and Further Empirical Evidence, Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 44: 745-775. 
 
Elmendorf, D. and N.G. Mankiw (1999) Government debt, in John Taylor and Michael 
Woodford, eds. Handbook of Macroeconomics 1(1): 1615-1669. 
   40
Geanakoplos, J. and S. Zeldes (2010) Market Valuation of Accrued Social Security Benefits, 
in D. Lucas (ed.) Measuring and Managing Federal Financial Risk, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Gold, J. and N. Hudson (2003) Creating Value in Pension Plans (or, Gentlemen Prefer 
Bonds), Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 15(4): 51-57. 
 
Gürkaynak, R., B. Sack, and J. Wright (2007) The U.S. Treasury Yield Curve: 1961 to 
the Present, Journal of Monetary Economics 54: 2291–2304. 
 
Gürkaynak, R., B. Sack, and J. Wright (2008) The TIPS Yield Curve and Inflation 
Compensation, Finance and Economics Discussion Series working paper 2008-
05, Federal Reserve Board. 
 
Jermann, U. (1999) Social Security and Institutions for Intergenerational, Intragenerational, 
and International Risk Sharing: A Comment, Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public 
Policy 50: 205-212. 
 
Lucas, D. and S. Zeldes (2006) Valuing and Hedging Defined Benefit Pension Obligations – 
The Role of Stocks Revisited, working paper Northwestern and Columbia 
Universities. 
 
Lucas, D. and S. Zeldes (2009) How Should Public Pension Plans Invest?, American 
Economic Review 99(2): 527-532. 
 
Lustig, H. and S. Van Nieuwerburgh (2008) The Returns on Human Capital: Good News on 
Wall Street is Bad News on Main Street, Review of Financial Studies 21(5): 2097-
2137. 
 
McDonald, R. (1983) Government Debt and Private Leverage: An Extension of the Miller 
Theorem, Journal of Public Economics 22: 303-325. 
 
Mercer LLC (2010) Mercer Pension Discount Yield Curve and Index Rates, available at 
http://www.mercer.com/pensiondiscount . 
 
Merton, R. (1980) On Estimating the Expected Return on the Market: An Exploratory 
Investigation, Journal of Financial Economics 8(4): 323-361. 
 
Modigliani, F. and M. Miller (1958) The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the 
Theory of Investment, American Economic Review 48 (3): 261–297. 
 
Munnell, A., T. Calabrese, A. Monk, and J-P. Aubry (2010) Pension Obligation Bonds: 
Financial Crisis Exposes Risks, Boston College Center for Retirement Research 
Brief SLP 9. 
   41
Munnell, A., R. Kopcke, J-P. Aubry, and L. Quinby (2010) Valuing Liabilities in State and 
Local Plans, Boston College Center for Retirement Research Brief SLP 11. 
 
Munnell, A., K. Haverstick, S. Sass, and J-P. Aubry (2008) The Miracle of Funding by State 
and Local Pension Plans, Boston College Center for Retirement Research Brief SLP 
5. 
 
Munnell, A. and M. Soto (2007) State and Local Pensions are Different from Private Plans, 
Boston College Center for Retirement Research Brief SLP 1.  
 
Park, Y. (2008) Public Pension Plan Asset Allocations, Employee Benefit Research Institute 
Notes 30(4): 1-11. 
 
Peng, J. (2009) State and Local Pension Fund Management, CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL. 
 
Pennacchi, G. (1999) The Value of Guarantees on Pension Fund Returns, Journal of Risk 
and Insurance 66: 219-237. 
 
Peskin, M. (2001) Asset/Liability Management in the Public Sector, in Olivia Mitchell and 
Edwin Hustead, eds., Pensions in the Public Sector, Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press. 
 
Novy-Marx, R. and J. Rauh (2009) The Liabilities and Risks of State-Sponsored Pension 
Plans, Journal of Economic Perspectives 23(4): 191-210. 
 
Ricardo, D. (1820) Essay on the Funding System, published posthumously in Encyclopaedia 
Britannica: Supplement (1824). 
 
Ruthen, S. (2005) Defined Benefit Pension Plans’ Interest Rate Exposure at Record High, 
PIMCO Publication (February): 1-6. 
 
Ryan, R. and F. Fabozzi (2002) Rethinking Pension Liabilities and Asset Allocation, Journal 
of Portfolio Management 28 (Summer): 1-9. 
 
Steffen, K. (2001) State Employee Plans, in Olivia Mitchell and Edwin Hustead, eds., 
Pensions in the Public Sector, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
 
Vasicek, O. (1977) An Equilibrium Characterization of the Term Structure, Journal of 
Financial Economics 5: 177-188.   42
Figure 1 


























   43
Figure 2 









0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18















































   44
Table 1 
 





























             
Rates of Return:              
          Mean  0.0533 0.0488 0.0727 0.0529 0.0858 0.1295 0.0815 0.0666 0.0293 0.0795 0.0795 
     Standard Deviation  0.1714 0.1891 0.0885 0.0838 0.2447 0.1232 0.0512 0.0601 0.0107 0.1376 0.0971 
          Minimum  -0.1939 -0.2496 -0.0908 -0.0609 -0.3913 -0.1567 -0.0537 -0.0927 0.0010 -0.1466 -0.1285 
          Maximum  0.1007 0.1341 0.1072 0.0768 0.2841 0.1466 0.0501 0.0588 0.0196 0.1760 0.0976 
Correlation  Matrix:             
US  Equities  1           
Non-US  Equities  0.87091  1          
US  Fixed  Income  0.06412  0.11068  1         
Non-US  Fixed  Income  0.04328  0.22146  0.49819  1        
US-Real  Estate    0.57669  0.57607  0.17921  0.16747  1       
Private  Equity  0.79986  0.73599  -0.20965  -0.17387  0.46705  1      
Hedge  Funds  0.63777 0.69356 0.12148 0.02080 0.33082 0.74276  1         
TIPS  0.06630 0.14086 0.70857 0.49254 0.25107  -0.07349 0.15824  1       
S&L  Wage  Growth  -0.27389 -0.29040  0.20711  0.14081 -0.00980 -0.25375 -0.21839  0.15864  1   
15-Year  Nominal  Bond  -0.07907  -0.04836 0.94010 0.46061 0.02485  -0.29953  -0.01632 0.66265  0.25426 1   
15-Year  Real  Bond  0.04059 0.11604 0.72275 0.49579 0.16940  -0.18294 0.14551 0.95675  0.18128 0.68908  1 
             
Observations:  159 159 159 159 159  52 159 159  52 159 159 
 
Note: Summary statistics for rates of return on eight different asset categories: U.S. Equities; Non-U.S. Equities; U.S. Fixed Income; Non-U.S. Fixed Income; 
U.S. Real Estate; Private Equity; Hedge Funds; and Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS), as well as State and Local Employee Cost Index wage 
growth and 15-Year Nominal and Real (TIPS) Bond returns.  State and local employee wage growth and private equity returns are calculated based on quarterly 
data from the second quarter of 1997 to the first quarter of 2010.  All other statistics are calculated from monthly return data between February 1997 and April 
2010.  Means and standard deviations are annualized.  Minimums and maximums for wage growth and private equity are one quarter rates while minimums and 
maximums for the other series are one month rates.    45
Table 2 
 
Correlations of Equity and Bond Returns with National Wage Growth, 1952- 2008 
 
 
Panel A: Correlation between National Wage Index Growth and S&P500 Return 
Holding Period  Correlation   Observations t-statistics  p-value 
one-year -0.0389  57  -0.2890  0.7737 
three-year 0.0246  19  0.1014  0.9205 
five-year -0.4348  11  -1.4483  0.1815 
seven-year -0.2860  8  -0.7312  0.4922 
nine-year -0.4406  6  -0.9816  0.3819 
     
Panel B: Correlation between National Wage Index Growth and 20-year Treasury bond Return 
Holding Period  Correlation   Observations t-statistics  p-value 
one-year -0.2163  57  -1.6427  0.1061 
three-year -0.3201  19  -1.3932  0.1815 
five-year -0.2645  11  -0.8228  0.4319 
seven-year 0.0859  8  0.2113  0.8397 
nine-year 0.2449  6  0.5053  0.6399 
     
Panel C: Correlation between National Wage Index Growth and 10-year Treasury note Return 
Holding Period  Correlation   Observations t-statistics  p-value 
one-year -0.1095  57  -0.8171  0.4174 
three-year -0.0961  19  -0.3979  0.6957 
five-year -0.0746  11  -0.2245  0.8274 
seven-year 0.2753  8  0.7013  0.5094 
nine-year 0.4752  6  1.0802  0.3408 
     
Note: National Wage Index is taken from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.  The returns on the S&P 500 Index, the 10-year Treasury note and the 20-year 
Treasury bond were obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).   46
Table 3 
 
Time Series of Average Asset Allocations, Tracking Error Volatilities, and Funding Ratio 
 
 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Asset Class Allocations:            
US  Equities  0.3996 0.4174 0.3966 0.4261 0.4363 0.4322 0.4172 0.3957 0.3378 0.3299 
Non-US  Equities  0.1231 0.1197 0.1303 0.1348 0.1497 0.1534 0.1743 0.1848 0.1802 0.1880 
US  Fixed  Income  0.2796 0.3258 0.3306 0.3162 0.2769 0.2757 0.2648 0.2629 0.2588 0.2486 
Non-US  Fixed  Income  0.0156 0.0144 0.0141 0.0122 0.0116 0.0114 0.0087 0.0085 0.0143 0.0090 
US-Real  Estate    0.0314 0.0372 0.0418 0.0405 0.0396 0.0434 0.0520 0.0553 0.0647 0.0524 
Private  Equity  0.0378 0.0427 0.0419 0.0456 0.0429 0.0432 0.0454 0.0499 0.0715 0.0659 
Hedge  Fund  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0013 0.0089 0.0082 0.0115 0.0238 
Other  0.0091 0.0027 0.0037 0.0087 0.0269 0.0235 0.0286 0.0267 0.0342 0.0303 
            
Tracking Error Volatilities for Benchmark:            
Nominal Liabilities  0.1697  0.1661 0.1651 0.1691 0.1753 0.1756 0.1778 0.1779 0.1751 0.1755 
Real  Liabilities  0.1372 0.1338 0.1327 0.1363 0.1419 0.1421 0.1438 0.1437 0.1406 0.1406 
Nominal Liabilities Demographically Adjusted  0.1687 0.1651 0.1634 0.1678 0.1742 0.1746 0.1761 0.1764 0.1732 0.1748 
Real Liabilities Demographically Adjusted  0.1363 0.1329 0.1312 0.1351 0.1408 0.1410 0.1422 0.1423 0.1389 0.1396 
Average  Asset  Allocation  of  Peers  0.0195 0.0187 0.0185 0.0173 0.0157 0.0159 0.0163 0.0162 0.0171 0.0143 
            
Funding Ratio  1.0852 0.9226 0.7912 0.7775 0.8250 0.8454 0.8618 0.9336 0.7831 0.5832 
Return on Investments  -0.0129  -0.0524  -0.0723  0.2093 0.1304 0.0807 0.1429 0.0678 -0.3067  0.1881 
Note: Sample average over 125 state pension plans for eight different asset allocations, various tracking error volatilities, funding ratios (market value of assets 
divided by actuarial value of liabilities), and return on investments.  The returns on investments were estimated as the product of their asset-class allocation 










Tracking Error Minimizing Allocations 
 
























US Equities  -0.0886  -0.1259  0    0.0794  -0.1320  0.0094  0  0 
Non-US Equities  -0.0109  -0.0285  0    0.1109  0.0669  -0.0160  0  0 
US Fixed Income  1.5991  1.3586  1    -0.0005  0.1702  0.6048  0.6998  0.1367 
Non-US Fixed Income  -0.0103  -0.1719  0    -0.1405  -0.1131  0.1814  0.2143  0 
US-Real Estate   -0.0662  -0.0322  0    -0.0167  -0.0037  0.0395  0.0034  0 
Private Equity  0.2442  -  0    -0.3460  -  -0.2021  0  0 
Hedge  Fund  -0.6673 -  0    -0.0725 -  0.3830  0.0824  0 
TIPS  -   -  -    1.3859  1.0117  -   -  0.8633 
                
Tracking Error Standard 
Deviation 
0.04054 0.05004  0.06444    0.02945 0.06613  0.06444  0.06583  0.04436 
 
Note: The entries are the pension asset portfolio weights that minimize a typical pension fund’s tracking error volatility. 





   48
Table 5 
 
Regression Variable Summary Statistics 
 
 
Variable Observations  Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Dependent Variable; Tracking Error Volatility:      
Nominal Liabilities  1121  0.1726 0.0177 0.0658 0.2074 
Real Liabilities  1121  0.1392 0.0142 0.0703 0.1725 
Nominal Liabilities Demographically Adjusted  903  0.1712  0.0209  0.0746  0.2163 
Real Liabilities Demographically Adjusted 903  0.1380  0.0154  0.0741  0.1734 
Average Asset Allocation of Peers  1121  0.0171  0.0132  0.0026  0.1294 
          
Primary Explanatory Variables:       
Funding Ratio  1121  0.8528  0.1970  0.1908  1.7520 
Return on Investments  1121  0.0345  0.1463  -0.3891  0.2529 
          
Governance Variables:       
Participants to Total Board Members  921  0.5646  0.2227  0  1 
Dummy for Separate Investment Council  930  0.3839  0.4866  0  1 
Dummy for Legal Restrictions 930  0.3086  0.4622  0  1 
       
Other Control Variables:       
Natural log of Market Value of Assets  1121 22.6602  1.3605  19.2661  26.2487 
Payroll to Actuarial Liabilities  1121  0.2360  0.2029  0.0085  2.6248 
Discount Rate  1121  0.0801  0.0039  0.07  0.09 
Dummy for Teachers Fund  930  0.5065  0.5002  0  1 
Dummy for General State Fund  930  0.6226  0.4850  0  1 
Dummy for Police and Fire Fighters Fund  930  0.4441  0.4971  0  1 
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Table 6 Tracking Error Regression Results 
  Dependent Variable: Tracking Error Volatility 
Liabilities Unadjusted  Liabilities Demographically Adjusted  Tracking Error 
Volatility Benchmark  Nominal Liabilities  Real Liabilities    Nominal Liabilities  Real Liabilities   
Average Asset 
Allocation of Peers 
                      
Lag Funding Ratio  -0.004  -0.0115  -0.0038  -0.0105    -0.0051  -0.0108  -0.0043  -0.0096    0.006  0.0167 
 (.29)  (.02)  (.25)  (.01)    (.20)  (.04)  (.20)  (.04)   (.04)  (.00) 
Lag Return Relative to Peer Average  -0.0942  -0.0975  -0.0804  -0.0807    -0.0923  -0.0997  -0.078  -0.0821    0.015  0.0289 
 (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)    (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)   (.07)  (.00) 
Lag of Ln Market Value of Assets  0.0006  0.0079  0.0007  0.007    0.0005  0.0068  0.0008  0.0055    -0.0007  -0.0157 
 (.59)  (.09)  (.43)  (.10)    (.74)  (.18)  (.43)  (.22)    (.48)  (.00) 
Lag Discount Rate  1.3779  1.0515  1.1758  0.916  1.2486 1.2819  1.0842  1.0936    -0.2521 0.0088 
 (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)    (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00)   (.11)  (.96) 
Lag Payroll to Actuarial Liabilities  -0.0062  -0.0023  -0.0058  -0.0024  0.0072 -0.0035  0.0036  -0.0039    0.0008  0.0004 
 (.22)  (.75)  (.16)  (.71)    (.19)  (.63)  (.41)  (.55)   (.86)  (.94) 
Participants to Total Board Members  0.0125    0.0107      0.0192    0.0152      -0.0022   
 (.04)   (.02)     (.01)   (.00)     (.70)   
Dummy for Teachers Fund  0.0016    0.001      0.0027    0.0012      0.0003   
 (.63)   (.70)     (.50)   (.65)     (.91)   
Dummy for General State Fund  -0.0009    -0.0008      0.0004    -0.0005      0.0025   
 (.78)   (.75)     (.92)   (.84)     (.40)   
Dummy for Police and Fire Fighters Fund  -0.0039   -0.0031     -0.0036    -0.0031     0.0001   
 (.22)   (.19)     (.35)   (.24)     (.97)   
Dummy for Separate Investment Council  0.0000   0.0002     -0.0023   -0.0012     0.0021   
 (.99)   (.91)     (.51)   (.61)     (.43)   
Dummy for Legal Restrictions  0.0013   0.0009     0.0028   0.0017    -0.0022   
 (.66)   (.69)      (.45)   (.50)     (.44)   
                     
Fund Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No  Yes    No Yes  No  Yes    No Yes 
N 811  986  811  986    787  795  787  795    811  986 
R
2 0.34  0.089  0.36  0.1    0.28  0.079  0.32  0.13    0.064  0.000053 
Note: Each regression includes time (year) fixed effects. Numbers in parenthesis are p-values. The dependent variable in all regressions is tracking error volatility.  In columns (1) 
and (2) tracking error volatility is constructed assuming 15-year duration nominal liabilities with no demographic adjustments.  In columns (3) and (4) tracking error volatility is 
constructed assuming 15-year duration real liabilities with no demographic adjustment.  In columns (5) and (6) tracking error volatility is constructed assuming 15-year duration 
nominal liabilities with demographic adjustment for the ratio of active to total participants.  In columns (7) and (8) tracking error volatility is constructed assuming 15-year 
duration real liabilities with demographic adjustment for the ratio of active to total participants.  In columns (9) and (10) tracking error volatility is constructed assuming a 
benchmark equal to the average sample asset allocation of peer public pension funds. 